

1: Previous Work



Vision Access Control In Facial Identity Protection

Why Protect Facial Identity?

- Facial images are extensively collected and disseminated.



Electronic Payments




Video Surveillance



Social Photo Sharing

- Deep learning-based face recognition (FR) is **highly accurate** and **widely accessible**.

- **InsightFace** open-sourced various advanced FR models, e.g., ArcFace.
- Leading companies also open up their available APIs, e.g., **Face++**



- **Anyone** can use FR tools to obtain facial identity without authorization.

- Facial identity is **immutable**; once leaked by unauthorized FR, it remains leaked for life.



Location tracking



Identity fraud

Limitations of Traditional Methods

- Traditional methods obscure the visual content of facial features for identity protection.



Blurred

Pixelated

Masked

Limitation 1: Low Visual Naturalness-> Susceptible to Attacks

- Poor visual quality can **easily attract the attention** of adversaries
- Distinguishable visual effects also **reveal the purpose** of privacy protection.

Then, adversaries can leverage various forms of background knowledge to **infer the original identity**.


Limitation 2: Low Visual Utility

- The post-processing degradation of facial images undermines their effectiveness for **face detection and attribute recognition tasks**


Advanced Methods

Advanced methods overcome two major limitations of traditional methods and can be categorized into two classes:

- **Synthesis-based Method:** Such methods generate a face with a new identity to replace the original face, thus **removing** the original identity.
- **Perturbation-based Method:** Such methods add quasi-imperceptible noise to disturb the judgment of Face Recognition (FR) models, thus **concealing** the original identity.




Synthesis-based Method



Perturbation-based Method

Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection

➔ Who can access the real facial identity?



Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection


➔ Who can access the real facial identity?

Control 0

Human vision



Machine vision




Original Version

Control 2

Human vision




Machine vision




Protected Version

Control 1

Human vision




Machine vision




Control 3


Human vision



Machine vision




Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection



Control 1

With two Limitations

Traditional Method




Synthesis-based Method




Control 1

Human vision




Machine vision



Our Work 1


Control 1 Inserting a usable message in a robust way, while synthesizing a new face for privacy protection.



[2025 IEEE TIFS] **Tao Wang**, Wenying Weng*, Xiangli Xiao, et al. Beyond Privacy: Generating Privacy-Preserving Faces Supporting Robust Image Authentication. *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*


Our Work 1

Control 1 Introducing a **improved differential privacy** mechanism, while synthesizing a new face for privacy protection.



[2025 IEEE TPAMI] Yushu Zhang, Junhao Ji*, **Tao Wang**, et al. Make Identity Indistinguishable: Utility-Preserving Face Dataset Publication with Provable Privacy Guarantees. *IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence*

Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection



Control 2

Perturbation-based Method




Control 2

Human vision




Machine vision




Our Work 2

Control 2 Generate a **user-specific (not image-specific)** perturbation to conceal identity for machine vision, link to a **predefined** identity




[2025 IEEE TDSC] Yushu Zhang, Zixuan Yang, Tao Wang*, et al. Tailor-made Face Privacy Protection via Class-wise Targeted Universal Adversarial Perturbations. *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing*

Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection



Control 3

Our work: Identity Hider




➡ Attention!

Unlike **privacy-preserving face recognition (PPFR)**, the results they generate **lack naturalness and visual utility**.


With two Limitations
Privacy-preserving face recognition



Human vision



Machine vision




[2024 ACM MM] Zixuan Yang, Yushu Zhang*, Tao Wang, et al. Once-for-all: Efficient Visual Face Privacy Protection via Person-specific Veils. *ACM International Conference on Multimedia*


Our Work 3

Control 3 Generate a **virtual appearance** and replace the original appearance, concealing identity for human vision

I: Virtual Face Generation Module



II: Appearance Transfer Module



(keep a **similar semantic maps** to preserve visual utility)

[2025 IEEE TBIOM] **Tao Wang**, Yushu Zhang*, Zixuan Yang, et al. Seeing is not Believing: An Identity Hider for Human Vision Privacy Protection. *IEEE Transactions on Biometrics, Behavior, and Identity Science*

Sub-Summary


➔ Who can access the real facial identity?

Control 0

Human vision




Machine vision




Original Version

Control 2

Human vision




Machine vision




Protected Version

Control 1

Human vision




Machine vision




Control 3

Human vision



Machine vision



➡ Thought


Are there any other options for access control?



Human vision




Machine vision




Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection

➔ Who can access the real facial identity?

Control 4




Control 5




Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection

➔ Who can access the real facial identity?



Our Work 4

Control 4 Embedding virtual identity for cancelable FR (only the **right recognizer** can extract), while synthesizing a new face



[2024 ACM MM] **Tao Wang**, Yushu Zhang*, Xiangli Xiao, et al. Make Privacy Renewable! Generating Privacy-Preserving Faces Supporting Cancelable Biometric Recognition. *ACM International Conference on Multimedia*

Our Work 4

[2024 ACM MM] Tao Wang, Yushu Zhang*, Xiangli Xiao, et al. Make Privacy Renewable! Generating Privacy-Preserving Faces Supporting Cancelable Biometric Recognition. *ACM International Conference on Multimedia*

This work is also **the first** to generate **faces** (not features) with **cancelable biometrics**, and a work[2025IJCB] attempted to improve upon it.

FaceAnonyMixer: Cancelable Faces via Identity Consistent Latent Space Mixing

Mohammed Talha Alam¹, Fahad Shamshad¹, Fakhri Karray^{1,2}, Karthik Nandakumar^{1,3}


¹Mohamed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, UAE

²University of Waterloo, Canada ³Michigan State University, USA

{mohammed.alam, fahad.shamshad, fakhri.karray, karthik.nandakumar}@mbzuai.ac.ae


Vision Access Control in Facial Identity Protection

➔ Who can access the real facial identity?




Our Work 5

Control 5 Alter identity for blocking FR models, reduce alterations in certain areas with **high perceptual sensitivity**



[2025 Arxiv] **Tao Wang**, Yushu Zhang*, Xiangli Xiao, Kun Xu, Lin Yuan, Wenying Wen, and Yuming Fang. Make Identity Unextractable yet Perceptible: Synthesis-Based Privacy Protection for Subject Faces in Photos

Summary



End

THANK YOU



Thank You!

I sincerely appreciate the time and insightful guidance from everyone today.